Five in the Morning
Imagine it is five in the morning. Somewhere in your neighbourhood a woman is carrying crates of tomatoes from a bakkie to the same patch of pavement she has used for years. A man is wheeling a fridge of cold drinks down a lane. A young woman is setting up a plastic chair and a mirror in a backyard room, ready to braid hair until the light fades. By seven the taxi rank has an airtime seller, a fruit seller, a phone charger and three people frying vetkoek. None of them has a payslip. Every one of them is, in the language of the labour statistics, employed.
That is the first half of the paradox this analysis is about. In the fourth quarter of 2025, about one in three employed South Africans, 5.7 million of 17.1 million, were in informal employment (Statistics South Africa, 2026a; Business Day, 2026). In the second quarter of 2026, when the formal sector shed 41,000 jobs and private households 9,000, the informal sector added 34,000 (Statistics South Africa, 2026c; Sunday Tribune, 2026). The second half of the paradox is how the same economy is treated once the survey is over. It is counted late, defined in ways that keep changing, and governed by municipal officials who decide where its workers may stand.
This platform reads policy, people and the digital pulse together, and the informal economy is where all three collide. It is where the unemployment figures this platform has tracked turn into something people do with their hands (see The Silence Between Stats). It is where the immigration argument finds its most visible targets (see the 30 June signal post). And it is run, day to day, not by Parliament but by a council, which is why it was on the ballot on 4 November 2026 (see Closest to the Tap). The argument here is simple. South Africa counts the corner as employment and governs it as a nuisance, and the people on it are almost absent from the public conversation about them.
The Corner Is Larger Than the Policy
Start with how fast it has grown. Stats SA's own presentations show non agricultural informal sector employment rising from 2.4 million in the fourth quarter of 2014 to 3.3 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, while formal employment rose from 10.9 million to 11.7 million. Over the same decade, from the first quarter of 2015 to the first quarter of 2025, the informal sector grew from 2.5 million to 3.3 million and the formal sector from 10.8 million to 11.4 million (Statistics South Africa, 2025a; Statistics South Africa, 2025b). Calculated from those figures, the informal sector grew by roughly a third in a decade and the formal sector by roughly six or seven percent, which means the corner has been growing about five times as fast as the payroll economy.
It is also the economy that moves first when conditions change. In the fourth quarter of 2025 the formal sector added 320,000 jobs while the informal sector lost 293,000, and most of the informal losses came from trade, which shed 100,000 jobs, followed by agriculture, manufacturing and finance (Statistics South Africa, 2026a; Business Day, 2026). In the second quarter of 2026 the pattern reversed: the number of unemployed rose by 345,000 to 8.5 million and employment fell by 16,000 to 16.7 million, yet the informal sector added 34,000 jobs and trade added 70,000 across the economy (Statistics South Africa, 2026c; Engineering News, 2026b; SAnews, 2026b). Informal work is not a net that holds. It is a net that stretches.
Compared with the rest of the world, South Africa still looks unusual. The International Labour Organization estimates that more than 60 percent of the world's employed people, around two billion, work informally, and that in Africa the share is 85.8 percent (International Labour Organization, 2018; United Nations, 2018). A paper that has shaped South African thinking for two decades found that the country was an outlier, with an unusually small informal sector alongside very high open unemployment (Kingdon & Knight, 2004; Global Poverty Research Group, n.d.). The question that paper raised is still the right one: why was the corner not bigger?
What "Informal" Means After 2025
The word is older than most of the policy that uses it. Keith Hart gave "informal income opportunities" their name in his study of urban Ghana, and the International Labour Organization's 1972 mission to Kenya carried the idea into policy (Hart, 1973; Chen, 2012). The international standards later separated two ideas that are easy to confuse. The informal sector counts enterprises, and informal employment counts jobs, whether in a street stall or a registered company, that lack protections such as social insurance and paid leave (Chen, 2012; International Labour Organization, 2018).
South Africa changed what it counts in 2025. Before then, informal employment was identified mainly by the absence of medical aid and a written contract, and the informal sector by a business's registration and size. From the third quarter of 2025, social insurance and paid leave became the test for informal employment, and registration for VAT or income tax became the main test for the informal sector, with the size of the enterprise no longer a requirement (EWN, 2025c; Business Day, 2025e; Business Day, 2026).
The effect was large. In the first release under the new definitions informal employment jumped by 635,000, largely because 920,000 agricultural workers were brought into the categories, and analysts estimated that the definition alone reallocated around 400,000 workers from formal to informal employment (South African Reserve Bank, 2025; Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies, 2025). Analysts at Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies argue that the revision makes it impossible to analyse trends in informal employment over the past year, and that it defines "formal" largely in terms of standard European employment benefits, such as a private pension, rather than income or technology (Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies, 2026; Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies, 2025). Stats SA itself says that estimates from the third quarter of 2025 are not comparable with earlier quarters (Cape Argus, 2026; Statistics South Africa, 2026d). Put plainly, "informal" in the new numbers increasingly means "without a benefits package". That is a useful measure of insecurity, but it is not a measure of hustle, and it should not be read as one.
The Fight Over the Number
The definition fight went public in June 2025. Capitec's chief executive, Gerrie Fourie, said in an interview with Business Day that South Africa's real unemployment rate was closer to 10 percent than the official 32.9 percent, because so many people trading in township informal markets were not being counted (Business Day, 2025a; Statistics South Africa, 2025c). Statistician General Risenga Maluleke rejected the claim as "incorrect and misleading" (Engineering News, 2025; Daily Investor, 2025). Stats SA said the Quarterly Labour Force Survey, which draws on about 30,000 households, already includes informal and self employed workers, and that the rate counts as unemployed only people who are actively looking for work, "regardless of whether employment is formal or informal" (Statistics South Africa, 2025c; Sunday Times, 2025a).
Both sides were right about something. Stats SA is right that informal workers are already counted as employed, which is why the headline rate cannot fall to 10 percent without moving millions of people who are not working at all. Fourie is right that the country knows much less than it should about the small enterprises behind the workers. At a meeting in Stellenbosch on 3 July, facilitated by Minister Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, Stats SA, Treasury and Fourie described the discussion as constructive, and Stats SA said it was open to developing a statistical register of small and informal businesses (Statistics South Africa, 2025c; The Mercury, 2025). A parliamentary reply in October 2025 placed responsibility for a national register of informal businesses with the Department of Small Business Development, not with Stats SA (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2025a; Business Day, 2025b). Fourie said later in July that he still believed the real rate was 10 percent (Sunday Times, 2025b).
The more useful comparison is between the numbers Stats SA publishes side by side. In the second quarter of 2026 the official rate was 33.6 percent, the combined rate of unemployment and time related underemployment was 36.6 percent, and the combined rate of unemployment and the potential labour force, which includes discouraged job seekers, was 43.8 percent, 10.2 percentage points above the official rate (Statistics South Africa, 2026d; Engineering News, 2026b; BusinessTech, 2026). The argument about whether the true figure is 10 percent or 34 percent hides the more important disagreement, which is about what counts as work at all.
Who Is on the Corner
The popular picture of the informal economy is of untaxed cash. The research says otherwise. Michael Rogan and Caroline Skinner found that 73 percent of informal operators earn well below the income tax threshold of R79,000 a year, with the typical own account worker earning R18 an hour if a man and R13 if a woman (Rogan & Skinner, 2019; Fin24, 2020). A major edited study found that almost 80 percent of about 1.4 million informal enterprises are one person firms, that the firms that employ others provided about 850,000 paid jobs in 2013, and that in 2014 the typical formal worker earned about R4,300 a month against about R2,000 for the typical informal worker (Fourie, 2018; Polity, 2018).
Low earnings are not the same as low value. Research on household incomes found that per job, informal work does between half and all of what a formal job does to reduce poverty, so that destroying 100 informal jobs does the damage of losing 60 to 80 formal jobs (Cichello & Rogan, 2018; Polity, 2017). The same work cautions that there are too few informal jobs to substantially reduce poverty nationally, and that grants and formal jobs dominate in aggregate (Polity, 2017; Fourie, 2018).
It is also not one labour market. Heintz and Posel (2008) document persistent earnings differences between formal and informal work and between different kinds of informal work, and challenge the idea of informal employment as an undifferentiated residual with free entry and exit (Heintz & Posel, 2008; Kingdon & Knight, 2004). A woman selling vegetables at a taxi rank, a builder with a team of six, and a domestic worker with no contract are all "informal", and they are not facing the same risks.
The Back Door
Not every informal job is on a corner. Some are behind a door. Between 6 and 7 percent of employed people work in private households, a group that includes domestic workers (Statistics South Africa, 2026a; Statistics South Africa, 2025a). Imagine the woman who irons shirts in a suburban house and then catches two taxis to a township to cook for her own children. Her employment is real, and the protections of a formal job often do not reach her. Reporting in 2025 and 2026 continues to warn that domestic workers fall through the cracks of the UIF system and that registering them is not optional (Business Report, 2025; IOL, 2026c), and in 2019 it was reported that a third of domestic workers were not registered for the fund (Daily Maverick, 2019; HeraldLIVE, 2019).
The lockdown showed what that means. In April 2020, 31 percent of informal workers who had not lost their livelihoods were completely locked out of work, against 26 percent of formal workers, and women in informal self employment saw their typical earnings fall by nearly 70 percent between February and April (Rogan & Skinner, 2020; Rhodes University Institute for Social and Economic Research, 2020; The Conversation, 2020). The woman behind the door appears in no permit queue. She appears in the survey, and, when the shock arrives, in the statistics of who lost the most.
A Corner With a History
It helps to remember how the rules for the corner were made. Scholars describe the attitude of central and local government under apartheid to informal enterprises, especially those run by black South Africans, as harsh and repressive, with the control of street traders part of the wider control of urban space (Lund, n.d.; Skinner, 2008). The Businesses Act of 1991 replaced many apartheid era trading licences with a system of permits regulating where traders could operate (Horn, n.d.; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, n.d.). Kingdon and Knight (2004) point to the legacy of that history, with licensing and restrictive by laws, among the barriers that keep the informal sector smaller than it might be (Kingdon & Knight, 2004; Global Poverty Research Group, n.d.).
That is not a claim that today's officials share yesterday's aims. It is an observation that the corner has always been a contest over who may stand where, and that the contest has been settled, again and again, by whoever controls the permit.
The Law Being Rewritten
The rules for the corner are being rewritten, and this section is current as of 5 November 2026. In June 2025 the government gazetted a National Business Licensing Policy, which proposed to cut the red tape around licensing (UCT Libraries, 2025; Business Day, 2025c). In September a draft Business Licensing Bill followed, open for public comment until 28 November (Acts Online, 2025; Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2025b). Critics were fierce. The Centre for Development and Enterprise called the draft the most anti business legislation since the end of apartheid, and commentators warned that it could add red tape rather than remove it (Business Day, 2025d; IOL, 2025).
The government did not drop it. In February 2026 President Ramaphosa signalled in his State of the Nation address that the bill would proceed, and by May the Department of Small Business Development had rescinded the draft and published a revised Business Licensing Bill, released on 26 May 2026 (Business Report, 2026; Democratic Alliance, 2026; Daily Investor, 2026; Small Business Institute, 2026). The revised bill is still a draft, and whether informal traders will be required to hold a licence under it was still being argued about as of November 2026 (Daily Investor, 2026; Small Business Institute, 2026). It matters here because a national law would be applied, in practice, by more than 200 municipalities, which are the places where the permit queue already fails (see below).
The Council on the Corner
In practice that is the municipality. Street trading is a municipal competence under Schedule 5B of the Constitution, and informal trade is regulated mainly through municipal by laws alongside the national Businesses Act of 1991 (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2026b). The national Department of Cooperative Governance told Parliament in March 2026 that the information on trading permits is held by municipalities and not by the national department (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2026a; Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2026b).
What the cities reported is revealing. Over five years, Cape Town issued 16,567 street trading permits and licences, alongside 1,372 informal trading contracts for designated bays, eThekwini issued 11,700 permits, and Tshwane 2,506, with permitted traders accounting for 32.8 percent of trading activity in Tshwane's central business district (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2026b). For Cape Town's centre, the City said it could not provide a split between permitted and unpermitted trading (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2026b). In July 2026, protesters in Cape Town demanded that the City reveal how informal trading permits are distributed (IOL, 2026a; Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2026b).
Johannesburg shows what happens when the permit is the bottleneck. On 2 October 2025, traders were removed from De Villiers Street in the inner city, and on 3 November 2025 the Gauteng High Court ordered the City to verify and register the affected traders and allocate trading spaces within two weeks (Daily Maverick, 2025; Socio-Economic Rights Institute, 2025). The City began a verification process days later and faced a looming deadline (EWN, 2025a; EWN, 2025b). By April 2026, hundreds of traders said they were still waiting for permits and trading spaces, and the traders' organisation described the process as chaotic (GroundUp, 2026; Sowetan, 2026).
Behind those figures are people. One of them, who had sold fruit and vegetables on Rissik Street for 30 years, told GroundUp she had been chased away in October and had since been hurt while fleeing metro police, and that she looks after three grandchildren: "I have to do my business for them to survive." Another said that many traders would rather play cat and mouse with the police than stay home (GroundUp, 2026; Sowetan, 2026). Neither is a statistic, and neither appears anywhere in the 113 voices this platform has archived.
The Day the Corner Became a Crime Scene
In October 2024, six primary school children in Naledi, Soweto, died after allegedly eating snacks bought from a spaza shop. The National Institute for Communicable Diseases concluded that terbufos, a highly hazardous agricultural pesticide, was directly to blame (Sunday World, 2024; Sunday World, 2025). By December the government counted more than 890 cases of foodborne illness across all nine provinces since September, and by February 2025 nearly 30 deaths, with at least 22 children among the dead by December (SAnews, 2024; SAnews, 2025b; Sunday Independent, 2024).
On 15 November 2024 the President ordered every spaza shop and food handling outlet to register with its municipality within 21 days. When the period ended on 17 December, 42,915 applications had been received and 19,385 approved, 1,041 shops had been closed, and the deadline was moved to 28 February 2025 (SAnews, 2024; News24, 2024; Sunday World, 2024). On 28 February the government said there would be no further extension and added that registration alone did not make a business eligible to trade (SAnews, 2025b; News24, 2024). Two things were being demanded at once: registration as a business, and compliance with health regulations (SAnews, 2024; News24, 2024).
That sequence shows how the state tends to meet the corner: through an emergency, a deadline and a compliance regime, with support arriving later. It also put a long running argument about ownership into a food safety crisis. Research in Delft, Cape Town, found that within five years foreign entrepreneurs, overwhelmingly Somali, had come to own around half of the spaza market, and that foreign run shops succeeded through social networks and collective buying (Charman et al., 2012; Liedeman et al., 2013). In May 2026 the MK Party tabled a private member's bill to reserve spaza shop ownership for South African citizens, and ActionSA has proposed its own #Spaza4Locals bill that would reserve the sector for South Africans (IOL, 2026b; Business Day, 2026b; Sunday World, n.d.; Polity, 2026). Rogan and Skinner (2019) note that punitive approaches have often been driven by a wish to regulate foreign migrants, even though migrants are a minority of informal operators (Rogan & Skinner, 2019). These are political choices, and they are being argued on the campaign trail as well as in Parliament.
What the Feed Says, and What It Cannot
This is where the digital pulse matters. This platform has archived 113 public posts and comments, 77 from seven national conversations since April and 36 from the week before the 4 November election. Three mention small trade, vending or livelihoods at all. None is written in the first person by someone who sells, braids, fixes or hauls for a living, and none mentions a trading permit, a by law or a metro police officer (Dipuo, 2026a; Dipuo, 2026b).
One, with 14,000 likes, says load shedding "killed businesses" and "destroyed livelihoods" (see Someone Is Lying About Loadshedding). Another, in the October asylum conversation, pictures foreign born traders as people who "run lucrative businesses worth millions in hard cash", and 9,300 people liked it (see The Door That Opened and Closed). The research points elsewhere: most informal operators earn below the tax threshold, and the study of foreign run spaza shops credits social networks and collective buying for their success (Rogan & Skinner, 2019; Liedeman et al., 2013). A third comment defends "mothers selling vegetables on the streets" against marchers who, it says, beat them up (Dipuo, 2026a).
The youth voices say something the labour tables cannot. In the signal post on unemployment, a user wrote "We are not lazy. We are trying. There are just no opportunities", and 317 people liked it (see Young People Are Not The Problem). The research supports them: South Africa's unemployed are worse off than they would be if informally employed, so unemployment is not simply a choice, and the barriers to entry include licensing, by laws, crime and low incomes (Kingdon & Knight, 2004; Global Poverty Research Group, n.d.). The youth unemployment rate in the second quarter of 2026 was 47.4 percent (Statistics South Africa, 2026c; SAnews, 2026b; see The Numbers).
Read this way, the archive has three silences. The first is the first person, because nobody writes as a trader. The second is municipal, because not one voice mentions the permit, the by law or the metro police officer that decides a trader's week. The third is numerical, because people argue about unemployment as a rate and never as the sum of a thousand corners. A platform that listens for the pulse has to notice what it does not hear. That is why this analysis leans on court orders, parliamentary replies and reporting from the pavement to carry a voice that is missing from the room.
Hustle Is Not a Policy
"Hustle" is a strong word, and a South African one. It praises invention and grit, and it quietly excuses a system that has run out of jobs. When a country tells its young people to hustle, it is also telling them that the formal economy has no room for them and that the places where they will find work are governed by rules written for someone else. Six things follow from the evidence above.
Build the register and publish it by municipality. Stats SA has said it is open to a statistical register of small and informal businesses, and the parliamentary replies show that the municipal level data that would feed one is not held nationally (Statistics South Africa, 2025c; Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2026a; Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2026b).
Treat the permit as a service delivery indicator. The Johannesburg order and the Cape Town protests show that the bottleneck is administrative rather than legal (Daily Maverick, 2025; GroundUp, 2026; IOL, 2026a). A trader's permit is a municipal service like a water connection, and it should be reported and audited like one.
Put capacity before compliance. The spaza registration drive showed the cost of demanding registration before inspections and support were in place (SAnews, 2024; News24, 2024; SAnews, 2025b).
Adopt due process before removal. Researchers at the Socio-Economic Rights Institute, working with the South African Local Government Association, made 23 proposals in 2018 for regulating informal trade, and the removals in Johannesburg were challenged for happening without a court order or notice (Daily Maverick, 2018; Socio-Economic Rights Institute, 2025).
Protect the work, not only formalise it. Rogan and Skinner argue that municipal by laws that criminalise informal work should be reviewed, that traders need water, toilets, storage and shelter, and that most operators earn too little to owe income tax (Rogan & Skinner, 2019; Fin24, 2020).
Keep the measure honest. If informal has come to mean "without a benefits package", the series should be back cast so that the public can see trends, and the register should count the enterprises behind the jobs (Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies, 2026; South African Reserve Bank, 2025).
A country cannot ask a third of its workers to hustle, and then treat the places where they do it as a nuisance to be cleared.
A Final Word: On Being Counted
Go back to five in the morning. The woman with the tomatoes does not think of herself as part of the informal economy. She thinks of herself as the person who feeds her children. She is also, in the language of this analysis, a source of employment, a taxpayer in every sense but the formal one, a voter, a municipal service user, and a person whose livelihood depends on a permit decision made in an office she may never see.
On Wednesday, 4 November 2026, voters chose the councils that write, enforce and sometimes fail to enforce the rules of the corner. The informal economy was not on the ballot paper. But the person who decides where the woman with the tomatoes may stand was, and whoever won those seats inherits the permit queue.
This analysis draws on published labour market research, Stats SA releases and presentations, parliamentary replies, court related reporting and press coverage, all checked against the original or at least two independent sources before use, with this platform's own archive of 113 public voices (collected 30 April to 29 October 2026) read for small trade, vending and livelihood terms followed by a manual read. The growth comparison between the informal and formal sectors is the author's calculation from Stats SA figures. Because Stats SA revised its sector definitions from the third quarter of 2025, figures before and after that point are not strictly comparable. The voices archived here are curated for reach and framing, not sampled. Figures current at publication on 5 November 2026. This is not legal, financial or business advice.
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© 2026 Dipuo Mokhokane. All rights reserved. Original policy research and analysis.
Figures in this analysis are as at 5 November 2026, the day it was published. For the latest figures, see The Numbers.